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BAR BRIEFS
against is not a benefit to the innocent, but a detriment. A full
statement of the accused person's explanations, made at the earliest moment is often the best means for him to secure a speedy
vindication." 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d. ed. 1923), sec. 867.
It is submitted that North Dakota should abolish the distinction between confessions and admissions in criminal cases and
require a preliminary examination as to voluntariness of any
statement that admits a part or all of a crime.
ALEX W. SKOROPAT.
TAKE NOTICE
Americanization and Citizenship Committee respectfully
directs your attention to the following recommendation contained
in the report of the 1939 Committee:
"That each attorney of this state take it on himself
to conduct and put on at least one patriotic program within his or her own county, on Constitution Day or week,
and at least one such program on Washington's or
Lincoln's day or week, in the county in which he or she
resides."
Anyone desiring to purchase a set of Corpus Juris in A-1
condition please write H. G. Nilles, Fargo, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In the Department of State Highways of the State of Worth Dakota, and
J. S.
nb, as State Highway Commissioner and the officer in charge of
said Department, Petrs. and Ayplts., vs. Berta E. Baker, as State Auditor
of the State of North ,Dakota, and John Omland, as State Treasurer of the
State of North Dakota, Respts.
That a subordinate ministerial officer to whom no injury can result and
to whom no violation of duty can be imputed by reason of compliance with
the statute, may not question the constitutionality of the statute imposing
such duty.
That under the circumstances in this case wherein it appears that the
state auditor is a constitutional officer against whom a proceeding is brought
to compel her to disburse public funds under a statute which the attorney
general, who is her legal adviser and Is also a constitutional officer, has advised is unconstitutional, and the question of constitutionality is of great
public importance, affecting many people, the public revenue of the state
and one of the major departments of the state government, It is held that the
state auditor may question the constitutionality of the statute upon which
the proceedings are based.
That Chapter 170, Session Laws 1939 does not amend or change any other
statute either directly or by implication.
That Section 64 of the Constitution was not intended to require the reenactment and pupblication at length of all definitions that might be employed in the construction of the law. Reference to other statutes may be
made to determine the meaning of terms used as an aid in determining legislative intent.
That where a statute levies a tax, -provides for ascertaining the amount
to be paid, and determines where the proceeds shall go, the failure to make
specific provisions for detailed procedure of collection of the tax does not
render the statute violative of Section 64 of the Constitution.
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That "where a part of a statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not require the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions
are connected in subject matter depending upon each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning
that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have passed the one without the other." Malin v. LaMoure County, 27 N. D. 140.
That the penalty provisions referred to in Chapter 170, Session Laws N.
D. 1939 are -held not to form the inducement for the enactment of the law
and even if void would not invalidate the remainder of the statute.
That the system of allowing refunds on motor vehicle fuel 'was abolished
by a contemporaneous statute (Chapter 147, Session Laws N. D. 1939) and the
reference thereto in Chapter 170, Session Laws *N. D. 1939 does not present
a question of unconstitutionality under Section 64 of the Constitution.
That for reasons stated in the opinion, it is held that Chapter 170, Session
Laws N. D. 1939 is not violative of either Sections 62 or 186 of the Constitution.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred J. Jansonlus, Judge.
REVERSED.
Opinion of the Court by Morris, J. Nuessle, Ch. J. concurs specially.
Christianson and Burke, JJ. dissent.
In Clara Jacobson, Pitf. and Reap., vs. Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association, a corporation, Deft and AppiLt.
That the term "accidental means" in an insuring clause of a health and
accident Insurance policy which insures against loss of life resulting directly
and independently of all other causes from bodily injuries sustained through
purely accidental means includes such means as produce effects which are
not their natural and probable consequences. An effect which does not ordinarily follow, an effect-which can not be reasonably anticipated from the use
of those means, an effect which the actor did not Intend to produce and can
not be charged with the design of producing, is an effect produced by accidental means.
That if the insured, during his work, is subjected to such great bodily
strain as results in injury to the heart, such injury is a 'bodily injury within
the meaning of the term employed in the foregoing insurance policy even
though there may be no wounds or bruises upon his body.
That recovery for loss of life resulting directly and independently of all
other causes from -bodily injuries sustained through purely accidental means
can not rest upon pure speculation, and where the cause of such death is
claimed to be the consequence of over-exertion, direct connection between
the over-exertion and the death must be shown by satisfactory proof.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonlus,
Judge. REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL ORIDERED. Opinion of the Court
by Burr, J. Morris, J., dissenting in -part.
In Lester Wilber McLean, Pltf. and Resp., vs. Cora M. Strauss McLean,
Deft. and Applt.
That in an action for divorce and for the support and maintenance of the
plaintiff the district court In which the action is brought has jurisdiction to
require the defendant to pay such sum of money as may be necessary for
the temporary support and maintenance of the plaintiff, and if a divorce
be granted, has jurisdiction to make such equitable distribution of the property of both parties as is just and proper, and may compel either party to
make such suitable allowance to the other for support during life or for such
period as the court may deem just. The district court has continuing jurisdiction from time to time to modify its order in this respect.
That under the law of this state it is as much the duty of the wife to
support and maintain the husband out of her separate property when he is
unable to take care of himself and she has sufficient property so to do, as it
is for the husband to support the wife under similar circumstances.
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That whether an appearance by the defendant is special or general is not
determined by the title assigned, but by what the party does, and where in
any so-called special appearance the defendant invokes the jurisdiction of
the court to determine certain issues in dispute between the parties and
which are involved in the trial of the case, such appearance becomes a general appearance, irrespective of its designation.
That in an action brought 'by a husband against his wife for divorce and
maintenance, where the complaint shows that the action is for divorce and
that the defendant has property within this state, within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and personal service of the summons and
complaint is made in another state, the court has power, in the determination of the action, to make an order requiring the defendant to pay such
sums for the maintenance and support of the husband as may be necessary
and just under all of the circumstances in the case and may subject the
p-roperty of the wife within the jurisdiction of the court to such claim.
5. The -property of a wife is not subject to the debts of her husband,
and her earnings and accumulations made while living separate from him
are her separate property.
6. "Upon the record It is held: that the district court erred in granting
the plaintiff judgment against the defendant in an amount sufficient to pay
the debts of the plaintiff involved in this action.
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Hon. John C. Lowe,
Special Judge.
MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Burr, J. Special Concurrences, Nuessle Ch. J.,
Christianson, J. Dissent in part, Burke, J.
In Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Minneapolis, a Corporation of Minneaoplis, Minnesota, Pltf and Applt., vs. John Rt. Stewart, A. A.
Stewart and Phoebe Stewart, Defts. and Respts.
That the courts of this State take judicial notice of the laws of the United
States and their scope whenever such laws are involved in the trial of cases.
In this case, therefore, the court takes judicial notice of the act of Congress
known as the "Farm Credit Administration" Act (Chap. 7, Title 12, USCA),
authorizing the organization of Regional Agricultural Credit Corporations
(sub-chap. 8 of said Chap. 7), together'with such rules and regulations of the
Farm Credit Administration authorized by said statute (secs. 1148 and 638 in
said Chap. 7), to be made for the purpose of such administration.
That under such statute and the rules made in conformity therewith,
counsel representing a Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation in the collection of an account due has no authority to enter into any agreement for
settlement of a debt secured by a chattel mortgage so as to waive the taking of a deficiency judgment.
That all -persons are conclusively presumed to know the law of the land,
and therefore, are charged with the knowledge that, under the aforesaid law,
counsel for the plaintiff had no authority to make an agreement waiving a
deficiency judgment, so as to 'bind the plaintiff in this case.
That record is examined and it is held; that plaintiff is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury and that it was reversible error
on the part of the trial court to deny it motion for said judgment.
Appeal from the District Court of 'Burleigh County, Hon. Fred Jansonius,
Judge.
JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS REVERSED AND JUDGMFNT
ORDERED FOR THE PLAI(NTIFF.
Opinion of the Court by Burr, J.

